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1. Introduction 
The American funded TV channel to the Middle East—
Al-Hurra—went on air with a specific mission in mind: 
challenging Al-Jazeera’s (the Qatari channel) predomi-
nance and winning Arabs’ hearts and minds. According 
to many American officials, there was a need to coun-
ter- balance “biased” Arab media. For example, in his 
2004 State of the Union address, President George W. 
Bush announced the launch of Al-Hurra in order to “cut 
through the barriers of hateful propaganda” (cited in 
Cochrane, 2004). However, the US public diplomacy 
mission was not very successful. Unlike Al-Jazeera, Al-
Hurra was never the “channel to go to” for the majority 
of Arabs. Not only did it fail to challenge Al-Jazeera’s 
supremacy, but it also lagged behind other Arab chan-
nels. Subsequent results of Zogby’s and the University 
of Maryland’s poll (2008, 2009, 2011) showed that Al-
Jazeera remained the most watched news channel for 
Arab viewers. In 2008, the polls found that after five 
years of being on air, Al-Hurra was the preferred news 
channel for only 2% of Arab viewers. 
The question then becomes how do regional satel-
lite media challenge the way the US conducts its public 
diplomacy in the Arab world? What is the difference 
between Al-Jazeera and Al-Hurra with regard to their 
media messages? This study argues that Al-Jazeera’s 
discourse is counter-hegemonic as it represents and in-
troduces a different set of ideas, values, and most im-
portantly, a different Arab identity. Similarly, the US 
public diplomacy initiative represented in Al-Hurra is 
an example of a hegemonic discourse that represents 
the most powerful state in global politics, and conse-
quently introduces another presentation of Arab iden-
tity that serves its political interests. 
2. Theoretical Framework: Media, Globalization and 
Hegemony 
Gramsci developed the term “hegemony” to describe 
how one class dominates the others by a combination 
of political and ideological means. In his view, media 
disseminates the ideas that maintain the status quo 
and keeps the elite’s grip over power policy 
(Abercombie, 1996, p. 161). Robert Cox introduced this 
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idea to the field of international relations by arguing 
that hegemony is important in preserving the stability 
of world order. In his view, great world powers have 
succeeded in establishing a global order favorable to 
their interests by promoting a set of hegemonic ideas 
in parallel with their coercive power (Callinicos, 2002, 
p. 275; Hobden & Jones, 1997, pp. 209-211). 
Not only is hegemony about ideas, but it is also 
about the representation of identities. As Butler (1999) 
and Mann (1999) argued, hegemonic discourse is essen-
tial to national identities as it contains references to, and 
social implications for, race, class and gender. This way, 
hegemonic discourse creates a national identity that is 
different or opposed to an international “other” 
(McPhail, 1991, p.34). Media obviously plays an essential 
role in developing and maintaining hegemony.  
However, with advancements in communication 
technologies, this hegemonic role of the media was 
questioned: how far do media represent the dominant 
group? Price Monroe’s (2002) idea of “market of loyal-
ties” shows how media is used to maintain the distribu-
tion of power by promoting a set of political views, cul-
tural ideas and slogans that maintain the existing 
power structure. New developments in media sphere, 
according to Monroe, challenges this arrangement. 
Governments can consequently respond either by re-
defining the power structure and accommodating new 
entrants or by taking effective steps to raise the barri-
ers of entry (Monroe, 2002, p. 33).  
Global media sphere has lifted the barriers of entry 
as it encouraged the creation of new national and re-
gional media (Figenschou, 2014, p. 5). This was particu-
larly the case with the Arab sphere since the 1990s. 
The CNN coverage of the Gulf War introduced Arab 
governments to the power of satellites (Robinson, 
2002) and confronted them with the ill performance of 
their national media; such a realization inspired the rise 
of Al-Jazeera which, subsequently, challenged Western 
hegemony over news production (Seib, 2008). 
In this way, satellite media have provided some op-
portunities for the disadvantaged to express them-
selves, define their interests, represent their identity 
and challenge the hegemonic discourse of the more 
powerful states (Volkmer, 1999, p. 48). When counter-
hegemonic discourse becomes much stronger, hegem-
ony fails (Lull, 2000, p. 71).  
3. Arab Identity 
Contextualizing Al-Jazeera’s identity discourse is im-
portant to understand its description as a pan-Arab 
media. It also serves as a preliminary step in comparing 
it to Al-Hurra. Defining identity was always a contesting 
issue among scholars. The traditional view perceives 
identity as a given based on the primordial factors. Ac-
cording to this perception, identity refers to a group of 
people sharing a common fixed culture, history, lan-
guage and most importantly, a common ancestry. On 
its part, social constructivism perceives identities as 
modern developments and inventions. Instead of fo-
cusing on the “objective” characters of the identities, 
constructivists deal with the phenomenon as mainly 
psychological and cultural artifact—i.e., an imagined 
community (Anderson, 1991).  
In his seminal work on the Transformation of the 
Public Sphere, Habermas (1989) defined public sphere 
as the domain of social life where public opinion is 
formed by discussing matters of general interest with-
out the interference of the authorities. In this virtual 
space, people interact, exchange ideas and infor-
mation, and discuss issues of general interests (McKee, 
2004, pp. 4-5). Media have been widely recognized as 
the modern manifestation of the bourgeoisie public 
sphere described by Habermas. This conception of the 
public and, consequently, media spheres is not far from 
the debate on identities. Traditionalists argue that 
people engage in the public sphere with a pre-given 
identity. In this case, media only reflect on the existing 
identity; if there is no existing collective identity, there 
would be no public sphere. In contrast, constructivists 
perceive the development of public sphere and collec-
tive identity as being constructed through the social, 
political and discursive practices. Building on this con-
ception, media thus play an important role in the rep-
resentation and formation of identities. In other words, 
the story of media spheres is conducive to the story of 
national identities.  
Although primordial claims are difficult to prove, it 
is possible to show how Arabs developed some sense 
of belonging before calling it “Arab nationalism,” i.e. 
before the political engineering of Arab identity. While 
many scholars disagree on dating the first appearance 
of Arab nationalism, most of them agree that Gamal 
Abdel Nasser’s era represented the peak of “Arab na-
tionalism”. The issues debated and circulated in the 
Arab media sphere have influenced the definition of 
Arab identity. The following discussion explores how 
the issues debated and circulated in the Arab media 
sphere have influenced the definition of Arab identity. 
3.1. The Arab Media Sphere and Arab Identity 
Building on the previous discussion on the traditional 
versus constructivist views on identities, this study dif-
ferentiates between Arabness/Arabism and Arab na-
tionalism/Pan-Arabism. Arabism is a cultural expres-
sion of identity that refers to, and includes, many 
elements like language, history, religion and culture. As 
for Arab nationalism, it adds to these cultural traits a po-
litical aim: uniting Arabs in a one single state. “Solidarity 
vs. unity” distinguishes the two terms. While solidarity is 
the ultimate goal of Arabism, Arab nationalism survives 
on the dream of unity (Dawisha, 2005, p. 8).  
According to Ernest Dawn (1973), Arab nationalism 
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started as an opposition movement in the Ottoman 
Empire without necessarily separatist tendencies. At 
that time, Arab admired Western scientific progress, 
but loathed Western accusations of Islam as the reason 
for Muslims’ underdevelopment. This was an Arab cul-
tural revival that stressed the role of the Arabic lan-
guage and the status of Arabs in the heritage of Islam. 
This trend was accompanied by the development of 
private print press by the new large-landowners class 
and a newly educated class composed largely of local 
Christians. Private press was generally tolerated as long 
as there was no direct criticism of the Ottoman gov-
ernment (Ayalon, 1995, pp. 28-29). 
Nascent Arab national consciousness was, thus, 
mainly based on language and culture to distinguish it-
self vis-à-vis the Ottomans. This could be called “Arab-
ness/Arabism.” At that time, the majority was still hop-
ing for special status for Arabs within the Ottoman 
Empire under the umbrella of Islam (Khalidi, 1981). It 
was only after the secular chauvinist trend of Young 
Turkish became clear that religion was employed. In-
dependence was presented as a preliminary step to re-
store the golden days of Arabs and consequently, Is-
lam. Turkish, in this way, became the Arabs “Other.” 
During World War I, Arabs fought with the allies 
against the Ottoman Empire. They asked for, and were 
promised, their independence. Post-war arrangements, 
however, wrote the first chapter in the tensioned history 
between Arabs and the West. Arabs were traumatized 
by what they considered as Western betrayal. This left 
deep imprints on the construction of Arab identity as in-
dependence became the primary concern of Arab na-
tionalists who framed colonialism as the Arab’s “other”. 
Under colonialism, media, represented in the press, 
played a vital role in developing the nationalist senti-
ments among Arabs. The interwar period was particu-
larly a period of relatively greater autonomy for the 
press (Ayalon, 1995, pp. 75-124) that led to the expan-
sion of the Arab public sphere. Writing about the dis-
tinctive characters of Arabs and the need for them to 
be united in one nation had flourished. Sati‘al-Husari’s 
writings reflected these ideas stressing the role of 
common history and language in Arab identity.  
However, the one issue that sparked the Arab pub-
lic sphere was that of Palestine and the danger of Jew-
ish immigration. Arabs from their different loyalties 
and perspectives all agreed on the need to resist the 
demographic changes that were under way in Palestine 
at that time (Dawisha, 2005, p. 107). When Arabs were 
defeated in 1948, the Palestinian issue became a defin-
ing mark in Arab identity. As Tareq Ismael (1976, pp. 12-
13) described, the defeat was “traumatic to the Arab 
masses…that it fostered a transformation of Arab na-
tionalism from the glories of the past to the failures—
particularly the failure in Palestine—of the present”. 
The post-independence phase stressed the role of 
the Arab state. Media became the state’s main institu-
tion in mobilizing popular support. The adopted top-
down model of communication stressed state’s unity 
as a predominant social value. Soon, the Egyptian Pres-
ident, Gamal Abdel Nasser, recognized the influential 
power of media on regional politics. This was the role 
played by the influential Egyptian radio station of Sawt 
Al- Arab (Voice of the Arab), that had sown the seeds 
of pan-Arab media. At that moment, the Arab’s “Oth-
er” was clear: imperialism and its local collaborators 
(Dawisha, 2005, p. 285). The Palestinian issue has since 
become a key issue, if not the key issue, in shaping Ar-
ab identity and modelling Arabs’ relationships with the 
West. Arabs themselves were classified into unionists 
and sovereigntists. The former promoted the idea of 
one Arab sovereign state where Arabs share oil wealth 
and receive equal treatment. The latter preferred soli-
darity and support for other fellow Arabs without nec-
essarily compromising their sovereignty or sharing 
their wealth. In other words, while the former defined 
Arab identity in terms of Arab nationalism/Pan-
Arabism, the latter perceived it as “Arabness/Arabism”.  
The perception of unity was built upon a glorious 
history and subsequent suffering (Chalala, 1987); it was 
also a unity of language and hope. These were the 
main elements that were stressed in the first phase of 
Arabism and circulated in the Arab public sphere. Then, 
a political dimension was added to these cultural fac-
tors: Arabs were to be united into one nation. This was 
the phase of Arab nationalism and the objectification 
of Arab identity.  
The shocking defeat in the 1967 war damaged Ar-
abs’ trust in their media for its fabricated news (James, 
2006), and obliged Arab nationalists to lower their de-
mands from Arab unity to Arab solidarity (Dawisha, 
2005, pp. 243-246). Moreover, conservative Arab 
states regained control over their media sphere after 
Nasser’s defeat. Saudi Arabia was one of the Arab 
countries that suffered the most from Nasser’s propa-
ganda. Therefore, following the 1967 war, the Saudis’ 
ownership of regional newspapers increased to pro-
mote a regional outlook consistent with their policies. 
With the Lebanese civil war, an increasing number of 
Lebanese journalists and newspapers relocated outside 
the region. Lebanese professionalism allied with Saudi 
money to dominate Arab media sphere (Miles, 2005, p. 
24). The defeat also exposed the failure of the secular-
oriented Arab nationalism (Kramer, 1993, pp. 171-206), 
and opened new venues for discussing allegiance to 
the ummah (Islamic community).  
This short overview shows how certain issues have 
always played an important role in the formation of 
Arab identity: history (particularly colonialism and rela-
tions with the West), Arab unity (defining who is in-
cluded or excluded and reflecting upon inter-Arab in-
teractions), the Palestinian issue (although related to 
the history of colonialism, it became a defining charac-
ter of its own), and religion (Islam). Arab identity rep-
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resentation in both Al-Hurra and Al-Jazeera will be ana-
lyzed against this background to see which factors are 
highlighted and those that are downplayed.  
4. Methodology 
This study mainly relies on critical discourse analysis 
(CDA), with occasional support from framing theory 
and content analysis, in analyzing the media messages 
of the two channels. According to CDA, discourse is an 
instrument of power, control and the social construc-
tion of reality. CDA is interested in how texts and 
speeches enact, reproduce and/or resist social power, 
dominance and inequality in the social and political 
contexts (Van Dijik, 2003). It is also interested in the 
study of identity construction and changes of identities 
at both the national and transnational levels (Wodak, 
2002, p. 18). The relevance of CDA to this study ema-
nates from the assumption that discourse shapes as 
well as expresses identities (Larson & Pepper, 2003), 
and its interest in the social processes and structures 
surrounding the production of a text which, conse-
quently, influences how individuals or groups create 
meaning in their interaction with the text (Wodak, 2002, 
p. 12). This means that it pays attention to certain ques-
tions such as, who is communicating, with whom and 
why. Moreover, it is concerned with the kind of society 
and situation that the communication targets and 
through what medium (Bell & Garret, 1998, p. 3). 
The study is particularly interested in the text itself 
(the discourse of the two channels) as well as its the 
socio-cultural (structural) contexts. The analysis, then, 
takes part on two levels: the macro level: analyzing the 
context of the discourse and the structural context of 
the media messages, and the micro-level: the language 
of the discourse, who is participating, and identifying 
who is “Us” vs. “Them”. In applying this tool, this study 
analyzes the context in which both channels started 
broadcasting and how this affected their future reputa-
tion and the reception of their messages. Secondly, the 
study examines the use of language in the discourse of 
both channels to see how tactical this usage is and how 
it relates to the assumption of identity they represent. 
Thirdly, the structure of the discourse itself is analyzed 
to check its consistency and uncover the ideological as-
sumptions, especially those related to the underlying 
perception of identity.  
Framing also helps in discerning the underlying rea-
sons for reporting the news in a certain way and in 
suggesting why certain pieces of news (or certain is-
sues) are given more emphasis than others (Allen, 
O’Laughlin, Japerson, & Sullivan, 1994, pp. 255-285). 
Framing analysis is closely connected and complemen-
tary to discourse analysis. Discussing the context in 
which the two channels appear and who were behind 
them, helps in understanding their respective frames.  
This study analyses two talk shows from each chan-
nel, in addition to the news bulletin during the Gaza 
2008–2009 War. In analyzing talk shows, the study 
pays special attention to the introduction given by the 
presenter as it defines the limits of what will/will not 
be discussed and the way the event is framed. By con-
trolling the premises of a discussion, the speaker can 
guide what their audience thinks about and influence 
the conclusions drawn (Bulter, 1999). 
In choosing the shows, the study selected shows 
that are as similar as possible in format. From Al-Hurra, 
the study chose Sa‘a Hura (Free Hour) which is a daily 
one-hour program that examines and discusses the 
news and stories of the day. The equivalent to this 
format in Al-Jazeera is Ma Wara’ Al Khabar (What is 
behind the news). The second program is Al-Itijahat al-
Arba‘(The Four Directions) in Al-Hurra which is a 
roundtable discussion that provides analysis and com-
ments on the main events of the previous week. The 
equivalent to this show in Al-Jazeera is Akthar Min Ra’y 
(More than One opinion).  
As the overview on Arab identity revealed, the Pal-
estinian issue occupies a special place in the formation 
of Arab identity. The Gaza War (2008–2009) was the 
first major event directly related to the Palestinian is-
sue that took place after Al-Hurra went on air. It is, 
therefore, interesting to see how the two channels 
dealt with the event. The study relies on two sets of 
data: the episodes of the selected talk shows (25 epi-
sodes from Al-Jazeera and 26 episodes from Al-Hurra), 
and the nightly news bulletin in both Al-Jazeera (Hasad 
al-Yum: the day’s harvest) and Al-Hurra (‘al’almiyya: 
The Global). The data is analyzed over the period from 
December 27, 2008 to January 18, 2009. The first date 
refers to the start of the war and the second corre-
sponds to Israel’s unilateral ceasefire. 
The study adopts a priori coding where the catego-
ries are already established before the analysis based 
on previous literatures and existing frameworks (Stem-
ler, 2001). The study selects the categories that serve 
its overall purpose and match its methodology. The se-
lected codes particularly correspond with discourse 
analysis and framing theory. The analysis derives codes 
from El Masry, El Shamy, Manning, Mills and Auter 
(2013), Figenschou (2014), and Dobering, Lobinger and 
Wetzstein (2010). The following variables and analyti-
cal categories were included in the overall analysis. 
 Representation of guests in each channel 
(Palestinians, Israelis, Other).  
 Representation of the Palestinian side (Fattah, 
Hamas, Other). 
 Representation of the Palestinian viewpoint 
(Hamas, Fattah, Other).  
 Information sources (Palestinian–Israeli) 
 Type of views represented (Official, Specialists, 
popular).  
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 Location of the first report (Palestine, Israel, 
Other).  
 Dominant Frames represented (humanitarian, 
political...). 
 Words used to describe Israeli and Palestinian 
actions. 
 Description of Israeli and Palestinian casualties. 
5. The Story of Two Channels: Contextual and 
Conceptual Aspects 
Understanding the historical moment and the different 
institutional arrangements within which each channel 
started working is a preliminary step in making sense of 
their discourse. Al-Jazeera was part of Sheikh Hamad 
bin Khalifa Al-Thani (Emir of Qatar 1998–2013) pro-
gressive plan to introduce a distinctive ruling style. 
From the beginning, the channel was playing an indis-
pensable role in Qatar’s attempt to redefine itself 
(Booth, 2010). This is why its “perceived” credibility, 
independence (Figenschou, 2014, p. 27), and nonparti-
san (el-Nawawy & Iskander, 2002, p. 33; Miles, 2005, 
pp. 28-29)1 were prerequisites to fulfil this role. It ex-
plains why the Qatari government officially distanced 
itself from Al-Jazeera and resisted the different pres-
sures to control its content. Al-Jazeera has also put an 
end to the Saudi-Lebanese hegemony over Arab media 
sphere (El Oifi, 2005, pp. 70-71), thus, changing the 
structure of media power relations in the region. 
Al-Jazeera quickly won a reputation as revolution-
ary and provocative by promoting debates about polit-
ical, religious and social topics that used to be taboo in 
Arab societies. The channel has successfully managed 
to project its identity beyond its funding country and 
its regional boundaries (Lahneman, 2005). Capitalizing 
on the Palestinian issue gave the channel its pan-Arab 
credentials and won it unprecedented regional fame 
(Miles, 2005, p. 73). Its coverage stirred up Arab public 
opinion against the US bias towards Israel (Bessaiso, 
2005, p. 160). 
The US war on Afghanistan ushered the end of 
Western media monopoly (Bessaiso, 2005, p. 165) as 
Al-Jazzera was the only channel allowed to work there. 
It was an example of information flow reversal: from 
the South/Orient to the North/Occident. Al-Jazeera pre-
sented an alternative news coverage highlighting civilian 
casualties caused by American air strikes. Deprived of its 
“on air supremacy”, the US attempted to influence the 
editorial independence of Al-Jazeera (El-Nawaey & Is-
kander, 2003, p. 176). The attempt itself ruined the US 
image as a supporter of media freedom and raised 
doubts regarding its discourse on democracy.  
                                                          
1 The so-called Arab Spring has exposed the built in contradic-
tions of Al-Jazeera and challenged its “perceived” independ-
ence due to the discernible stance taken by Qatar towards cer-
tain regional allies, and its impact on Al-Jazeera’s coverage. 
Against this background, the Iraqi war (2003) took 
place. For the second time, the US found itself losing 
the propaganda war. While pan-Arab media concen-
trated on the humanitarian sufferings and civilian loss 
due to “occupation”, their American counterparts por-
trayed the war as an act of popular liberation. With the 
increasing violence in Iraq, the US became furious with 
Arab media, particularly Al-Jazeera, for portraying 
these acts as “resistance” (Lynch, 2006, pp. 5-6). Con-
vinced by the importance of the “war of ideas,” the US 
decided to counter its perception as “arrogant, impa-
tient and unwilling to listen” by the Arab public opinion 
(McDonald, 2000, p. 69). Defining the problem as one 
of image and information deficit, the US approached 
the region assuming that American policies needed 
better marketing to win Arabs’ hearts and minds.  
Al-Hurra has, thus, arrived at an inappropriate mo-
ment where hostility to American policies in the region 
was at its highest because of its war on terrorism, a 
war that was widely perceived as a war against Islam. 
Language use has fed these pre-held conceptions. For 
example, the common greeting in Arab media is the Is-
lamic one of “al-sallamu ‘alaykum’” (peace be upon 
you). Al-Hurra’s presenters avoid this greeting and use 
‘welcome back’ instead. The greeting itself, as Bay-
louny correctly noted, confirms perceptions that the 
US is against the region’s religion (Baylouny, 2005, p. 
21). Moreover, Al-Hurra was a late comer to the Arab 
media sphere and encountered a very competitive envi-
ronment. Nevertheless, Al-Hurra’s founding perceptions 
assumed that Arab media sphere resembled the former 
Soviet Union space during the Cold War.2 Such a mistak-
en conception made Al-Hurra seem “redundant in con-
tent, and preachy in tone” (Kraidy, 2006, p. 3).  
Not only was Al-Hurra working in a highly competi-
tive media environment, but it was also influenced by 
institutional constraints that were not that obvious in 
Al-Jazeera (Collins, 2008). The channel was required to 
meet the expectation of Congress, American conserva-
tive press and people in Washington D.C as well as Ar-
ab audiences. Such an expectation is unattainable giv-
ing the different perspectives of these parties. In 
addition, Al-Hurra’s message lacked credibility. While 
its message was about freedom and democracy, the US 
                                                          
2 In his testimony in the House of Representative, Mouafac 
Harb claimed that:  
“Alhurra introduces to the region ideas of truth and freedom 
and democracy never before discussed. Alhurra brings to the 
vast region of the Middle East unprecedented town hall meet-
ings, talk shows, and debates….We have to continue to foster 
these conversations, these debates, until they become a part 
of the lives of the people of this region, until they become part 
of life in the Islamic world.” Statement of Mr. Mouafac Harb. 
Broadcasting Board of Governors and AlHurra Television. Hear-
ing before the subcommittee on oversight and investigations of 
the committee on international relations, House of Represent-
atives. First session, 10th November 2005. 
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was occupying Iraq and allying with authoritarian re-
gimes. The public diplomacy campaign was thus taint-
ed as an act of hypocrisy (Napoli & Fejeran, 2004). 
6. Discussion: Mapping the 2009 Gaza War Coverage 
on Both Channels: Content-Related Aspects 
Before delving into the details of the coverage of the 
two channels and its relationship to Arab identity rep-
resentation, it is important to highlight general obser-
vations on the way each of them covered the war.  
In general, Al-Hurra was more representative of the 
Israeli viewpoint. For example, in news bulletins, Israeli 
guests represented 32% of the total guests, while Pal-
estinian guests represented 28% (Table 1). Although 
the number of Palestinian guests (24%) in Al-Hurra’s 
daily discussion show “Free Hour” exceeded that of the 
Israeli guests (10%), the American guests (30%) were 
staunch defenders of the Israeli view (Figure 2). This 
raises the percentage of the Israeli point of view to 
40%. Moreover, the news excerpts from Israeli sources 
were 62%, while those from their Palestinian counter-
parts were 37%. News reporting started from the Israe-
li side 57% of the time, while reporting from Gaza 
started only 42% of the time, despite the expected in-
terest of Arab viewers to hear and see first from the 
Palestinian side. 
Table 1. The number of guests on each channel’s news bulletin. 
Criteria Al-Jazeera Al-Hurra 
No. of Palestinian Guests 29 16 
No. of Israeli Guests 6 18 
Other 98 22 
Total 133 56 
 
Figure 1. Representation of guests in Al-Jazeera’s talk show. 
 
Figure 2. Representation of guests on Al-Hurra's talk shows. 
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Al-Hurra’s representation of the Palestinian voice fa-
voured one party; Fattah (Figure 3 and Table 2). Pales-
tinians belonging to Fattah represented 28% of the 
Palestinian voice in “Free Hour”, while Hamas was not 
represented. Non-Palestinian guests represented 68% 
of the total guests where 40% of them were against 
Hamas and blamed the movement for the war. The 
same pattern appears in the news bulletins where Fat-
tah’s guests constituted 75% of the Palestinian voices, 
while Hamas was absent and other Palestinian voices 
only represented 35%. Al-Hurra focused more on the 
official viewpoint of different parties. Official voices 
represented 46% of the guests on the talk shows, while 
popular voices were only represented by 4%. The same 
applies to news bulletins where official voices repre-
sented 54% of the guests while popular voices repre-
sented 16%. (Figures 6 and 7). 
Table 2. Hamas’ point of view vs. Fattah in discussion shows 
Guests Al-Jazeera % Al-Hurra % 
Hamas 1 3 0 0 
Fattah 0 0 14 28 
Non-Affiliated Palestinians 10 26 2 4 
1-Supporting Hamas 10 26 1 2 
2-Against Hamas 0 0 0 0 
3- Neutral 0 0 1 2 
Other 28 72 34 68 
1-Supporting Hamas 16 41 1 2 
2-Against Hamas 4 10 20 40 
3- Neutral 8 21 13 26 
Total 39 100 50 100 
 
Figure 3. The Palestinian voice in news bulletins 
 
Figure 4. Percentage of excerpts from the Palestinian vis-a-vis the Israeli sources in the news.3 
                                                          
3 Any piece of news proceeded by: said, announced, confessed, recognized, broadcasted…etc. 
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Figure 5. The reporter who spoke first in the news. 
 
Figure 6. The popular vs. the official voices in news bulletins’ guests.4 
 
Figure 7. The official vs. popular voices in discussion shows’ guests.  
                                                          
4 The study considers the representative of Hamas and Fattah as part of the official voice, while the rest of the Palestinian groups and 
parties as popular voices. The same applies to the representatives of the UN. As for doctors and specialists in international law, they are 
counted as part of the specialists’ voice. 
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Al-Jazeera’s coverage reflected different trends. Israeli 
guests represented almost 5% of the guests in the 
news bulletins, while the Palestinians were 22%. This 
pattern was more visible in the channel’s daily discus-
sion show of ‘what is behind the news’ where Palestin-
ian guests constituted 31% of all the guests, while the 
Israelis were absent (Table 1 and Figure 1). While ex-
cerpts from the Israeli sources during the news bulle-
tins were used 23% of the time, those from the Pales-
tinian side represented 76% (Figure 5). Unlike Al-Hurra, 
news reports in Al-Jazeera used to begin with the Pal-
estinian side in Gaza (Figure 5). Interest in the Palestin-
ian side was also reflected in the number of reporters 
working in Gaza and the percentage of times (95%) the 
news reporting started from it (Figure 4). Al-Jazeera’s 
coverage was biased towards the party involved in the 
fight: Hamas. Therefore, the percentage of Palestinians 
in the news bulletins belonging to Fattah was 17%, 
while that representing Hamas was 38%. For the dis-
cussion shows, 3% belonged to Hamas in contrast to 
0% for those who belonged to Fattah. However, voices 
defending Hamas and representing its viewpoint, from 
either non-affiliated Palestinians or other guests, rep-
resented 67% (See Figures 3 and 4) 
In contrast to Al-Hurra, Al-Jazeera gave more air-
time to popular voices. The number of official voices in 
Al-Jazeera was 49 while the number of the popular 
voices was only 37. For Al-Hurra, the difference was 30 
vs. 9 in favor of the official voices. The fact that the 
specialists’ voices on Al-Jazeera were non-official ones, 
raises the percentage of the non-official voices to 63%. 
Regarding the discussion shows, the official voice was 
the minority (8%) vis-a-vis that of the people (18%) and 
of the specialists (74%) (Figures 6 and 7). This makes Al-
Jazeera more representative of the popular voice and 
promotes its image more as “the people’s channel”.  
Interest in listening to the public reflects how the 
public is generally perceived. The traditional percep-
tion of Arab citizen viewers is that they are “naive and 
overly critical, uncivilized and chaotic, unable to 
demonstrate peacefully” (Chaieb, 2007, p. 71). As Ab-
delmoula (2015, pp. 106-107) argued, when Al-Jazeera 
gives more airtime to Arab viewers, this reflects a con-
viction that the public deserve listening to and identify-
ing their needs. This perception represents, in his view, 
an “enlightening” role by Al-Jazeera for helping Arabs 
acquiring the courage to express their views free of 
fear without always waiting for guidance. By contrast, 
when Al-Hurra listens less to Arab viewers it endorses 
their negative image.  
The war coverage of the two channels can be 
mapped by comparing the following aspects: targets 
(Who/what was the target?), results (Who succeeded?), 
and the repercussions of the war. Answering these ques-
tions will reflect on the representation of the region’s 
identity in both channels, i.e. who is the “other”? What 
elements are stressed in identity construction?  
6.1. Target 
Al-Hurra’s coverage conveyed the message that the at-
tacks were mainly targeting Hamas and its locations in 
Gaza. The channel extensively repeated the Israeli as-
sertion that “all the targeted locations belong to Ha-
mas” (Al-‘Alamiyya, December 27, 2008). Graphic im-
ages mainly showed the destruction of buildings but 
filtered out civilian casualties and sufferings. Al-
Jazeera’s coverage in contrast conveyed the message 
that the attacks, or the aggression as was labelled, tar-
geted everyone in Gaza. The two channels employed 
language differently to present their respective cover-
age messages. Al-Hurra, for example, described people 
who lost their lives by Israeli strikes as being “killed”, 
while Al-Jazeera called them martyrs. Furthermore, Al-
Hurra labelled the strikes as a bombardment (qasf), not 
as a war or aggression, or even attacks as did Al-
Jazeera. Israeli military actions were also described as 
“operations”, not war as in Al-Jazeera to belittle the 
wide scale and strength of the action.  
Al-Jazeera developed a promo for the attacks show-
ing the scattered corpses of Palestinian police in Gaza 
while one of the wounded was raising his fingers enun-
ciating Islam’s two professions.5 The promo itself was 
enough to entice feelings of anger and sympathy as 
well as recalling the religious aspect. The promo’s title 
was “Gaza under Fire” and “War on Gaza” to indicate 
that it was a war on all of Gaza, not only on a certain 
group. Al-Hurra, for its part, and after a few days from 
the beginning of the war, developed its promo in which 
it showed an unidentified artillery truck and titled it as 
“War in Gaza.” Using the proposition “in” indicates that 
there were equal parties involved in the conflict with-
out blaming one particular party for waging the war. 
Reporting from the West Bank was also different 
between Al-Hurra and Al-Jazeera. For example, on De-
cember 28, 2009, Al-Jazeera’s news mentioned, “a Pal-
estinian youth was killed after the ‘occupation’ forces 
shot him in Ramallah” (Hasad Al-Yum, December 28, 
2008). This piece of news came immediately after re-
porting from Gaza in a way indicating that the occupa-
tion is the same and it kills “here” in Gaza and “there” 
in the West Bank. Al-Hurra reported the same story dif-
ferently. First, the story came after the news interval 
contextualizing it among the different reactions to the 
event. The news read as “a Palestinian youth was killed 
after clashes with the Israeli forces” (Al-‘Alamiyya, De-
cember 28, 2008). Noticeable here is how Al-Hurra 
used “Israeli” instead of “occupation” forces. Moreo-
ver, Al-Hurra mentioned that he was “killed after 
clashes with the Israeli forces” (Al-‘Alamiyya, Decem-
ber 27, 2008). This way, the channel did not directly 
                                                          
5 This is to profess that there is no God but God and that Mu-
hammad is the messenger of God. ašhadu ‘an laa ilāha illa 
(A)llāh, wa ‘ašhadu ‘anna Muhammada(n) rasūlo (A)llāh. 
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blame the Israeli forces for his death by portraying the 
incident as a result of mutual violence.  
In a manner of speaking, Al-Hurra’s coverage tried 
to exonerate Israel from accusations that it was inten-
tionally targeting civilians while Al-Jazeera’s was explic-
itly stressing the deliberation. Al-Jazeera made every 
effort to set the conflict in a broader context, one that 
recalled painful episodes from the region’s post-World 
War II history. Al-Hurra, on the other hand, tried to 
present the Gaza conflict as either a unique incident or 
one that was only representative of Israel–Hamas an-
tagonisms.  
6.1.1. Success 
The two channels introduced different definitions of 
war failure or success. For Al-Hurra, it was a matter of a 
balance of power, while Al-Jazeera considered it as a 
war of wills and defended the right to resist the occu-
pation. According to al-Hurra the operation resulted in 
a difficult humanitarian situation that needed exten-
sive diplomatic efforts to stop the fighting, not to put 
an end to occupation as al-Jazeera was conveying. Al-
Hurra portrayed Israel as the war’s winner. Reporters 
repeatedly described the “operation” as a success for 
Israel, which “feels comfortable and victorious” (Al-
‘Alamiyya, December 30, 2008). Al-Jazeera on the con-
trary, was stressing from the beginning that Israel was 
losing the war. The high death toll among Palestinians 
was itself, according to Al-Jazeera’s coverage, a sign 
that Israel failed to achieve its goals and, therefore, de-
cided to revenge. In other words, while Al-Hurra 
stressed rational material calculations in defining suc-
cess, Al-Jazeera adopted abstract and moral determi-
nants that corresponds more with the cultural beliefs 
in the region.  
6.1.1.1. Repercussions of the War 
Al-Hurra was mainly interested in the future of the 
peace process and the impact of the war on the region. 
The US role under the then new Obama administration 
was linked to this discussion. As for the impact of the 
war, it mainly referred to the future of the regimes, the 
future of the Palestinian authority vis-à-vis Hamas, the 
establishment of Israel’s power of deterrence and the 
influence of Islamic extremism.  
Al-Hurra’s coverage portrayed the Palestinian issue 
as the major source of Arab-Arab dispute. For example, 
the presenter of “Free Hour”—Hussein Jardi—asked “is 
it possible for the Gaza war to become an Arab- Arab 
conflict?” (Free Hour, January 14, 2008). Whether the 
war would strengthen or weaken Hamas was a big is-
sue on Al-Hurra. The way the discussion progressed in 
most episodes gave the impression that it was better if 
Hamas lost, implying that Israel has to take the time to 
finish its job. Hamas, in view of most “Free Hour” 
guests was not an option to be considered. Even if it 
was re-elected, one of the guests expressed, dealing 
with it was not possible. 
Al-Hurra introduced the Palestinian-Palestinian split 
as irreconcilable the same time it was discussing the 
possibility of resuming the peace process between the 
Palestinians and Israelis. There were questions about 
the possibility that the war “would change the face of 
the Palestinian-Israeli conflict in particular and the sit-
uation in the region in general, and whether the Israeli 
army would be able to put an end to Hamas” (Four Di-
rections, January 2, 2009). Putting these questions 
within Al-Hurra’s broader discussion framework imply 
that if Israel manages to terminate Hamas, there would 
be new arrangements that could change the face of the 
Palestinian–Israeli conflict. Hamas’ failure was, thus, in 
the best interest of the Palestinian authority as well as 
for the future of the peace process.6 
Al-Jazeera’s discussion on war repercussions was 
different. Its main interest was how to reframe Pales-
tinian unity and Arab positions within a broader strate-
gy of resistance. According to many of the guests, as 
well as the comments of the presenters, Palestinians 
should abandon the hopeless path of negotiation. Ac-
cording to Al-Jazeera’s extensive coverage, Arabs have 
to reconsider the choice of resistance and support the 
Palestinian armed groups.7 In contrast to Al-Hurra, Al-
Jazeera doubted the possibility of reaching any settle-
ment to the conflict without, effectively, engaging Ha-
mas. Moreover, the Palestinian issue, according to Al-
Jazeera’s coverage, was not a source of Arab divisions. 
On the contrary, the official Arab-Arab split is respon-
sible for blocking the Palestinian unity talk and deepen-
ing the Palestinian–Palestinian rift. Therefore, there 
was a necessity to overcome Arab divisions and take a 
united stance against the aggression on Gaza. 
6.1.1.1.1. Regional Identity Representation 
Al-Hurra’s war coverage conveyed the message that 
the region was suffering from an identity crisis, as divi-
sions were the focal point. This even applied to the 
Palestinians where Hamas–Fattah split received much 
focus in comparison to acts of solidarity spread in the 
Palestinian street. The Palestinian split was also news-
worthy compared to the clashes with the Israeli army 
                                                          
6 This was the hub of the discussion in Free Hour in several ep-
isodes: January 2nd, January 5th, January 6th, January 11th, 
January 12th and January 13th. 
7 In the episode of December 27, 2008, the spokesman of Ha-
mas in Beirut, Osama Hamdan, said that Israel wants to break 
the will of the resistance. The presenter interrupted him by 
saying we do not disagree over specifying what Israel wants. 
Al-Mawqif al-Arabi min al-‘Udwan al-Israili ‘Ala Gaza [The Arab 
Position Towards the Israeli Aggression on Gaza]. Muhammad 
Krishan. What is Behind the News. Al-Jazeera. Qatar, Doha. De-
cember 27, 2008.  
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in the West Bank. Al-Hurra never reported the acts of 
solidarity and demonstrations in the West Bank and 
the calls for unity. In this way, the Palestinian “other” 
was ambiguous: is it Hamas or Fattah? Meanwhile, 
“occupation” was neutralized. This “assumed” identity 
crisis led to ignoring Arab street’s expression of unity 
and solidarity. Adding to the identity crisis is the down-
played role of religion in Al-Hurra’s coverage. For ex-
ample, the channel never mentioned the position of 
the Organization of Islamic Conference or the opinion 
of famous religious figures.  
On its part, Al-Jazeera’s coverage reflected a region 
that suffers from a political rather than an identity cri-
sis. Divisions, according to Al-Jazeera, were mainly po-
litical in nature as solidarity and unity prevail on the 
popular level. Arab and Islamic solidarity in this view 
was a dominant feature of Arab Street. Political divi-
sions themselves were portrayed as a conspiracy facili-
tated by the collaboration of the region’s leaders. Clas-
sifications like “moderate” and “extremist” Arab states 
were refused by Al-Jazeera because they were imposed 
by the US and only worked in Israel’s interest. 
Arabs’ “other,” according to Al-Jazeera, was well 
defined. It was Israel that destabilizes the region, works 
on splitting it and kills innocents. News reported from 
Gaza and the West Bank was framed in a way that 
clearly identified the Palestinian, as well as Arabs’, 
“other”. It was Israel, not Hamas or Fattah, that was 
harming the Palestinian people. The occupation was 
the reason for their misery and split. The channel’s 
coverage accused Israel of trying to embarrass other 
Arabs by portraying them as accomplices in the aggres-
sion. Israel is blamed for all the wrongdoings in the re-
gion not Iran or Syria as Al-Hurra was conveying.  
Al-Jazeera’s coverage presented an idealized notion 
of Arab identity; a monolithic identity founded upon 
authentic elements that revolve around religion (Is-
lam), language and history. Religion, according to its 
coverage, was the glue that sticks Arabs together. Ac-
tivities by religious figures received ample coverage. 
The channel also used to host religious figures from all 
over the Islamic world to discuss the religious duties of 
Muslims in the face of the crisis. Even the language 
used had religious connotations. News presenters and 
reporters, for example, frequently repeated expres-
sions like “nusra” (religious solidarity). 
History was another element that distinguished the 
coverage of the two channels. Al-Hurra focused on the 
present and future, rather than the past. This was 
clear, for example, in tackling the issue of democracy 
and peace between Arabs and the Israelis. The channel 
was silent on US support for Israeli policies over the 
years, but President Obama’s position with regard to 
the issue of settlement was a focus point. This focus on 
the present and future makes the region’s identity 
elastic as it is needed to promote the interests of the 
more powerful. This also makes the people in the re-
gion more amenable to accept the hegemonic ideas 
that serve these interests.  
History in Al-Jazeera’s coverage, on the contrary, 
was always alive. The idea of resistance itself is highly 
representative of Arab history. Resistance has always 
been a main element in Arab’s identity that appears 
whenever Arabs encounter colonial or imperial threats 
to their identity. The Palestinian issue exemplifies the 
high relevance of history. Arab rights, as perceived in 
Al-Jazeera, are rooted in history, therefore, none of 
these rights should be surrendered. History is thus an 
indispensable component of the region’s identity. 
As for language, Al-Jazeera’s identity construction 
relies also on the use of standard Arabic. This reflects 
how the channel’s executives perceive the Arab public 
as one “rather than a multitude of publics dispersed in 
twenty-two separate countries” (Abdelmoula, 2015, p. 
116). Such a unifying factor is absent in Al-Hurra where 
different dialects are heard, particularly the Lebanese 
one in the beginning. Moreover, Al-Jazeera’s anchors, 
reporters and journalists tend to use the rhetorical 
power of Arabic to affect emotions in a way that influ-
ences the Arab public’s interpretation of events. 
Because identity representation has to resonate 
with the people, media strategies employed by Al-
Jazeera have been so far more successful than those of 
Al-Hurra. The former has the reputation as “the peo-
ple’s channel”, while the other seems to be out of 
touch with its audience. As Shibley Telhami (2003) ar-
gues:  
“Popular Arabic outlets succeeded because they re-
flected the hearts and minds of the region on core 
issues, not because they shaped them….[W]hile 
there are multiple reasons audiences view a partic-
ular station for news, the most critical factor is the 
extent to which a station reflects their views on is-
sues that matter most to them and to their identity. 
When a station fails to do this, viewers look for al-
ternatives.”8 
7. Conclusions 
The growth of transnational satellite television has 
challenged Western hegemony over news production. 
This has great repercussions on the United States and 
its actions/policies and threaten the effectiveness of its 
soft power. Arabs and Muslims increased access to in-
formation of their production had influenced the way 
they receive media messages from an outsider. Al-
Jazeera made it difficult for the US to sell its image and 
                                                          
8 We can extend the argument by comparing Al-Jazeera’s share 
of popularity during and after the so-called Arab Spring revolu-
tions. The change or fluctuation in its popularity may finds ex-
planation in its representation or challenge of deep rooted ide-
as, perceptions and identities of its audiences. 
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empowered an oppositional discourse that calls for au-
thenticity and independence (Lynch, 2006, p. 25). The 
presence of Al-Hurra is representative of the challeng-
es that the US policies are facing in the Arab world be-
cause of the influential role of the media. It shows how 
effective Al-Jazeera is to the extent that, as Ann Marie 
Baylony argued, it pushed the US to “legitimize itself, 
to defend itself against counter- [hegemonic] claims” 
(Baylouny, 2005).  
The 2008–2009 Gaza War coverage has shown how 
Al-Jazeera stressed history, religion and Arabism as the 
defining elements of the region’s identity. These are 
deeply rooted popular perceptions of Arab identity. Al-
Hurra omitted regional history, belittled or ignored the 
role of religion and focused on regional political divi-
sions. It promoted the image of a region that should 
get over its past and look forward to the future that 
marginalizes religion and history.  
As this analysis shows, there are three factors that 
influence the level of success of the two channels. 
These factors are related to the three Cs (3Cs): context, 
conception and content. The construction of identity 
lies at the heart of the intersection between these fac-
tors. For a message of public diplomacy to find its way 
to its targeted audience, a certain kind of harmonic in-
teraction needs to exist between these three compo-
nents. Any inconsistency among these elements leads 
to the failure and/or fall of the public diplomacy of the 
media. This is a preliminary step towards a model for 
evaluating the public diplomacy of the media. Further 
examination of these factors in the context of the so-
called Arab Spring is still needed to better understand 
the rise and fall of popularity of the two channels.  
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